DMARC
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) checks whether a passing SPF or DKIM result aligns with an email's visible From domain, and lets that domain publish handling and reporting policies.
A pass needs authentication and alignment
DMARC connects email authentication to the domain in the From address readers see. It can pass through either of two routes:
- SPF passes, and its authenticated envelope-sender domain aligns with the From domain.
- DKIM passes, and the signature’s signing domain aligns with the From domain.
One aligned passing route is enough. Both protocols do not have to pass. Conversely, SPF and DKIM can both pass for unrelated domains while DMARC fails.
Alignment can be strict, requiring identical domains, or relaxed, allowing domains that share the same organizational domain. The domain owner’s DMARC record controls which alignment modes apply.
The policy is a request to the receiver
A p=none policy asks for no DMARC-specific handling change. p=quarantine asks receivers to treat failures as suspicious, while p=reject asks them to reject failing mail. Receivers can apply their own policies, so the published setting does not guarantee a particular delivery outcome.
Reporting helps a domain owner investigate legitimate senders and failures before tightening policy. Otherwise, a missing sending service or a forwarding problem can disrupt wanted mail.
DMARC does not stop display-name spoofing or mail authenticated by a different, lookalike domain. Nor does it make mail from a compromised genuine account safe. The press-inquiry guide shows why a plausible request still needs verification beyond its authentication results.