Threat modeling
Threat modeling is a structured way to examine how a system or process could be harmed, which safeguards address those possibilities, and what still needs to be checked.
Make the assumptions visible
Start with what you are protecting and how it works. Identify the people, systems, data, permissions, and handoffs involved. Then examine how someone could misuse those relationships or how a failure could cause harm. OWASP applies threat modeling to business processes as well as software and infrastructure.
A diagram can help people notice a missing check, but the drawing is not the whole model. Keep the assumptions, possible threats, chosen safeguards, and unresolved questions with it.
Microsoft’s threat-modeling guidance uses STRIDE to organize different kinds of threats, including spoofing, tampering, and elevation of privilege. That is one method, not a requirement that every team use the same framework.
Turn the discussion into a decision
For a help-desk workflow, trace the point where a recovery request changes account access. Record who can approve the change, what they check, and what happens if that check fails. That gives the team something specific to improve or test.
A model proposes how harm could happen. It does not prove that an attacker can complete the path or assign a precise incident probability. Security risk assessment considers likelihood and impact, while an authorized test can investigate a specific assumption.
The assessment-design article and technical follow-on guide help turn a selected assumption into an authorized test. Update the model when access rules or the workflow change.