Phishing-resistant MFA

Phishing-resistant MFA combines multiple authentication factors with a protocol that prevents an impostor sign-in service from obtaining usable authentication secrets or outputs, without relying on the user to spot the deception.

Why a fake sign-in page cannot simply relay it

A typed one-time code can be passed from a fake sign-in page to the real service. Phishing-resistant authentication uses cryptography to bind the exchange to the intended service or channel, so the same trick does not work.

WebAuthn, used by FIDO2 authenticators, provides this binding. The protocol handles the check; protection does not depend on the user recognizing a convincing fake page.

Phishing resistance and multiple factors are separate properties

The method must also use multiple factors to qualify as phishing-resistant MFA. Merely possessing a security key does not establish how a particular sign-in used it.

In Entra, an authentication strength can require phishing-resistant MFA for selected resources. That entry explains the supported combinations and why a password prompt can still appear first.

This protection applies to the authentication exchange. A stolen session or a help desk tricked into enrolling an attacker’s authenticator is a different problem. Recovery and session controls still need their own protections.

Sources

See it in practice